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“Being Affluent, One Drinks Wine”: Wine Counterfeiting in Mainland China 
Introduction  
In the existing literature, counterfeiting activities are often presented in the category of 
intellectual property (IP) crimes, of which the legal basis is in the law concerning the protection 
of IPRs. Typically, counterfeit goods are films and sound recording, computer software, 
designer clothing, shoes and fashion accessories (Norman 2014). For ordinary consumers, 
counterfeiting – often associated with imitating luxury brands – seems to link with the fashion 
business and the middle-class lifestyle, and the word ‘counterfeiting’ is somehow glamorised. 
In fact, counterfeiting is an industry that is driven by market demand and profits and counterfeit 
goods can be ‘anything and everything’ (Antonopoulos et al. 2017). Despite an increase of 
academic inquiries into product counterfeiting in recent years, there is still a need to develop a 
broader and deeper understanding of the nature of the illicit trade, due to the complexity that it 
is evolving.  
Counterfeiting literature embraces a wide range of themes, in which IPR infringements 
are often centred. Consequently, economic losses of IPR owners, losses of state tax revenue 
and job losses as a result of the flow of ‘fake goods’, are used as measures to assess the cost of 
counterfeiting to local, regional and global economy. Accordingly, it is concluded that the 
counterfeiting trade have a considerable economic impact and therefore warrants official 
attention (e.g. UNODC 2014). Past research has also suggested links between counterfeiting 
and organised crime (e.g. HMSO 2006; Lowe 2006; Reynolds and McKee 2010; Satchwell 
2004; Treverton et al. 2009). An earlier concern with ‘general criminological indifference’ to 
IP crimes (see Anderson 1999; Yar 2005) may no longer sustain. On the other hand, commodity 
counterfeiting is not a top priority of law enforcement agencies, if we consider that it is not 
named by Lynne Owens – Director General of the National Crime Agency – under any of the 
three crime fighting priority headings: vulnerability, prosperity and commodity (see NCA 
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2017). This is perhaps because of other competing threats (e.g. the sexual exploitation of 
children, firearms smuggling, cybercrime, human trafficking and modern slavery). Possibly, it 
is also because product counterfeiting has traditionally been perceived as ‘victimless’ (see 
critiques in Anderson 1999; Yar 2005). The fact is that counterfeiting is a broad and 
complicated problem: apart from IPR violation, it may pose acute threats to public health and 
safety. The nature, organisational characteristics and potential harm of the trade in dangerous 
counterfeit goods need thorough investigation to gain fuller appreciation.    
This article focuses on one type of dangerous counterfeit goods – fake wines. It uses the 
wine counterfeiting trade in China as a single case study to discuss three important themes in 
relation to product counterfeiting: (1) the definition of counterfeiting; (2) the scope, scale and 
the social, operational and financial organisation of the counterfeit business; and (3) the 
policing of counterfeit goods – an important subject matter for academic research (Wall and 
Large 2010). The aim of this article is to broaden our knowledge about the counterfeiting 
business, develop a clear understanding of the illegitimate market, and help to renew and 
advance countermeasures that enable to exercise tight control over the counterfeiting industry 
and disrupt the behaviours of counterfeiters. 
The definitional issue of counterfeiting 
As indicated earlier, IP law provides the legal basis for prohibiting counterfeiting activities. 
While there is little agreement on its precise coverage (Bently and Sherman 2014), ‘intellectual 
property’ usually refers to a bundle of rights that protects applications of ideas and information 
which have commercial value (Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin 2013). Thus, IP law covers a 
number of areas of law, including copyright law, patent law and trademark law. Counterfeiting 
commonly refers to acts which involve infringement of others’ IPRs. It is not a legal term, but 
frequently used both legal and lay contexts (Yar 2005).  
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While counterfeiting is not defined in the law, legal definition for ‘counterfeit goods’ is 
available. The ‘Border Measures Regulation’ (EU Regulation No. 608/2013 concerning 
customs enforcement of IPRs), for example, provides the definition of ‘pirated’ or ‘counterfeit’ 
goods under Article 2(5) and (6): handling ‘counterfeit goods’ infringes trademarks, whilst 
dealing with ‘pirated goods’ involves infringements of copyright, related rights and design 
rights. Thus, IP infringement covers piracy and counterfeiting. In practice, however, 
infringement of some of the IPRs can be described as counterfeiting or piracy (Bainbridge 
2012). Often, ‘pirated’ and ‘counterfeit’ goods, and ‘counterfeiting’ and ‘product piracy’ are 
interchangeably used (e.g. Norman 2014; OECD 2016).  
Lin (2011) explained counterfeiting by dividing it into three types of infringements: first, 
the unauthorised use of a brand name or trademark; second, the use of names, designs and logos 
that intentionally resemble a brand; and third, the unauthorised sale of legitimately produced 
brand name goods – clearly, IP law is the basis of this classification. In fact, it is now accepted 
that counterfeiting causes harms beyond IPR infringements, and it should be clamped down to 
not only protect legitimate traders’ economic interests, but also prevent society from being 
deceived into buying substandard goods and, more importantly, to protect individual 
consumers from dangerous fake goods (Bainbridge 2012; HMSO 2006).  
This view has received formal recognition in some jurisdictions. In English law, for 
example, certain IP crimes are designated as serious offences under the Serious Crimes Act 
2007 to address the seriousness of those IP violations, prevent the trade in counterfeit goods 
that endangers public health and safety, and punish those who are engaged in the illegitimate 
business. In China, product counterfeiting gives rise to the breach of a variety of substantive 
laws, including the trademark law, consumer protection law as well as criminal law.  
Under the Chinese Criminal Law, product counterfeiting may primarily constitute two 
types of offences. One is the unlawful use of others’ registered trademarks (Sections 213-215), 
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and the other is the production of counterfeit (jia-mao) and/or substandard (wei-lie) products 
(Sections 140, 143). The latter category concerns public health and safety, for which the 
maximum penalty is a life sentence, whilst the second category outlaws counterfeiting 
trademarks, of which an offence is punishable by up to seven years imprisonment. In the 
existing law, the sale of counterfeit goods is also a criminal offence if a person has sold or 
offered counterfeit goods that exceed 50,000 yuan (about £5,700) (Section 149). Furthermore, 
if the fake and substandard products concerned are toxic and have led to deaths or serious 
personal injuries, the death penalty is available (Section 144). In cases concerning counterfeit 
foods and beverages, the Food Safety Law 2009 (FSL 2009) is usually triggered. It aims to 
strength food safety in China (Section 2) and bar bad practices in the food production chains 
(Section 28). Shu and Li (2014) point out that the law provides substances to the matching 
criminal law provisions.  
Chinese law appears to proclaim that wine counterfeiting amounts to not only IPR 
infringements but also a serious crime, which undermines the socialist market economic order 
and endangers public safety and health. In a similar vein, wine counterfeiting may amount to 
‘food fraud’. According to the UK’s Food Standards Agency (2016), food fraud is ‘a dishonest 
act or omission, relating to the production or supply of food, which is intended for personal 
gain or to cause loss to another party’. Therefore, wine counterfeiting may overlap with 
concepts such as ‘food fraud’ and ‘food crime’ in the field of research focusing on criminality 
and integrity in food supply chains (see e.g. Elliott 2014; Fassam and Dani 2017; Olmsted 2016; 
see more articles about the subject in British Food Journal).  
In order not to complicate the definitional issue (which remains unsettled), and to be in 
line with recent counterfeiting research into illegitimate alcohol (see e.g. Lecat et al. 2017; 
Lord et al. 2017; Shen and Antonopoulos 2016; Vandagraf 2015), this study discusses wine 
counterfeiting in the broad context of organised crime research. However, I will return to 
5 
 
provide an extended working definition of counterfeiting by adding some behaviours in food 
(wine) fraud in the conclusion.  
The scope, scale and process of the fake wine business in China  
The wine market has been rapidly growing in China since the mid-1990s. The number of wine 
manufacturers was around 130 in 1994, but reached to more than 600 in the beginning of the 
new millennium (Zhong 2002). Initially, wines were consumed mainly by urban youths and 
the middle-aged and high-salaried professionals in first- and second-tier cities in the developed 
coastal regions. In the 1990s, there was a popular saying: ‘Being wen-bao (having adequate 
food and clothing) one drinks liquor; being xiao-kang (fairly well-off), one drinks beer; and 
being fu-yu (affluent), one drinks wine (Liu 1998). Gradually, the wine market has expanded 
to third-tier cities and some rural areas (Li et al. 2007). Now, the wine market is ‘booming’ 
(Byrnes 2013) and accordingly, the wine industry is ‘thriving’ (Global Legal Post 2015).  
In the Chinese wine market, imported wines are increasingly gaining popularity. In the 
mid-1990s, foreign wines started to flood into China, mainly from France, Italy, Spain, Hungry, 
Portugal and Australia. Today, it was estimated that Europe exported nearly one billion US 
dollar worth of wine to China (Byrnes 2013), and imports represented more than 30 per cent 
of 1.9 billion bottles of wine sold annually in mainland China and Hong Kong (Huang 2012; 
Zhang et al. 2013). Unsurprisingly, the wine counterfeiting business is flourishing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
In the 1990s, copies were discovered of the top three branded Chinese wines – Zhangyu, 
the Great Wall and Dynasty – as well as some top-end foreign wine brands (Huang 2012). It 
was revealed that just under 50,000 bottles of Lafite were imported to China annually, but 
around two million bottles of ‘Lafite wine’ were sold (Zhang et al. 2013) – a counterfeiting 
phenomenon that is not unusual in the global wine market (Lecat et al. 2017).  
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Due to its clandestine nature, it is hard to gauge the scale of the wine counterfeiting 
business. Official statistics are unavailable. According to one journalistic account, 30 per cent 
of all alcohol in China was counterfeit, and probably 70 per cent of wines were fake (Shen and 
Antonopoulos 2016). An earlier estimate suggested that counterfeits took 57 per cent of the 
total amount of wine (400,000 tons) sold in the country annually (Wu and Wang 2002). 
Bartman (2013) observed that possibly over 70 per cent of the wines in China were not original 
– in other words, copies. French wines seem to be particularly targeted: one source suggested 
that one out of every two bottles of top-brand French wine sold in China was fake (Dinner 
Party Downloads 2015); for another, there was at least one counterfeit for every one authentic 
(Wine Spectator 2015).  
It should be noted that these figures are rough estimates and ‘impressionistic’ (Yar 2005) 
which are not true reflections of the scope and scale of the wine counterfeiting business, but 
they seem to be consistent with the anecdotal evidence. For example, in a popular TV series – 
Let’s Get Married – a bottle of fake Lafite was presented as genuine (Sina News 2013). 
Together, these figures and illustrations indicate a significant economic market of illegitimate 
wines, about which we still have no comprehensive knowledge. Lecat et al. (2017: 96) argue 
that ‘the key issue in the fighting against counterfeiting is to have a broad awareness of the 
whole supply chain in the wine industry’. I add that to identify the organisational characteristics 
of the wine counterfeiting industry and the everyday activities of counterfeiters is also salient. 
In this study, this is to be done by examining the wine counterfeiting process. 
The process of wine counterfeiting 
Generally speaking, the counterfeiting process primarily consists of manufacturing (including 
labelling and packaging), importation-exportation (if applicable), internal transport and 
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distribution (including sales) (see e.g. Shen et al. 2010). Wine counterfeiting is no exception. 
Several stages in the wine counterfeiting process are worth noting.  
1. Manufacture 
The choice of methods for manufacturing counterfeit goods is determined by a number of 
factors, including the level of start-up capital, expected quality of the fakes, availability of 
product knowledge, skills and technology, and costs. Existing data suggests that in wine 
counterfeiting, refilling of genuine empty bottles of high-end brands is a common method. It 
is cheap, does not require any special skills and can be done manually. This method involves 
reuse of recycled original bottles, to which usually genuine labels are still attached. Needless 
to say, using original bottles makes it easy to deceive innocent consumers. Relatedly, there was 
an ‘extraordinary demand’ for empty bottles of famous wines (Taylor 2016; Vandagraf 2015) 
and this explains why a buyer in Beijing paid 2,900 yuan (about £330) for a used bottle of 
Lafite Rothschild (Telegraph 2011).  
 Re-labelling is another common method which involves replicating bottles or labels of 
the genuine, usually cheap, brands. For example, to replace the label on the bottle of Charles 
Shaw with that of Castel in order to sell the fake Castel at a high price. In a police raid in 
Jiangsu, investigators saw several individuals washing off the original labels on the imported 
cheap wines at the premises of an international trading company, where the counterfeit labels 
of top-end foreign wine brands were also discovered (Editorial 2012).  
Furthermore, labelling is also frequently used in the fake wine production. In the 
counterfeiting industry, bai-ban (literally ‘blank board’, meaning unbranded and unlabelled 
products) are often produced. They are subsequently ‘branded’ with counterfeit labels of 
genuine brands according to order or demand (Guo 2002; Ye 2000). CCTV (2010) – China’s 
state television channel – reported that realistic fake labels and other packaging materials (e.g. 
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certificates of product origin, year of production and quality verification) were widely available 
in the black market (see also Fu et al. 2017).  
It appears that compared with that in traditional wine production countries, faking labels 
and packaging materials is much easier in China because the majority of the Chinese – 
consumers as well as counterfeiters – do not have much wine knowledge, nor do they know 
much English and any other foreign language (Yi 2011). People typically have no idea how the 
authentic looks like. Consequently, even obvious spelling mistakes and other erroneous details 
on the labels and packaging may not unveil the true identity of fakes. For the same reason, 
counterfeiters may simply make up brand names to label their fakes (Sun and Yao 2004) – such 
behaviour does not usually violate others’ IPRs. Boyce (2012) observed that often, wine 
counterfeiters use invented brand names and addresses relating to places abroad to claim a 
foreign appellation of wines which are in fact made in China. Consumers’ lack of wine 
knowledge has been taken advantage of by local counterfeiters as well as those overseas: along 
with legitimate European wine exporters, counterfeiters are increasingly cashing in to occupy 
China’s flourishing wine markets (Byrnes 2013). 
Product counterfeiting is clearly profit-driven. It should be noted that whichever methods 
are used, for counterfeiters, what matters is profitability. Existing data shows that while fake 
wines may be of high quality and that professionally imitated fakes are hard to distinguish from 
the genuine, more typically fakes are made of poor quality or diluted wine and sold as if they 
are genuine products of which they are copies (Editorial 2012). Counterfeit wines may be made 
of a mixture of water, wine juice or edible alcohol, colourant, fragrant essences and other 
chemical ingredients including thickening agent and preservative (Wang 2013) which are 
essentially false wines. In the worst case, the chemical ingredients used are health threatening 
(Editorial 2009). Frequent consumption of poor quality or false wines potentially leads to long 
term health consequences, adulteration and even personal injuries.  
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2. Exportation-Importation  
Imported wines are preferred to domestic products in China (Zhejiang Daily 2012). As a result, 
wines with a foreign label are usually tagged at a good price and sold well. Thus, foreign wines 
are frequently counterfeited. Counterfeit foreign wines may be imported fakes from overseas 
as well as locally produced ‘imports’.  
 Some fake wines are made overseas for the illegitimate wine market in China. They can 
be ready-made fakes, bottled – often unlabelled – low-end wines and cheap unbranded bulk 
wines. While the quality of imported wines varies, usually substandard products, known as 
yang-la-ji (foreign garbage) (Wang 2013; Zhong 2002; Zhu 2003), are shipped to China and 
subsequently bottled and labelled or re-labelled to ‘make’ imported wines. It was found that 
some counterfeiters succeeded the Customs clearance by forging documentation (Editorial 
2012).  
 The data here shows that it is more often that cheap, unbranded bulk wines are supplied 
to China. Sometimes, overseas wine makers used unconsumable grapes to produce wine for 
exportation. These imports need re-processing by adding in chemicals to remove mouldy 
smells and improve the colour. Often, alcoholic component immersed considerably in the 
lengthy international transport process, and to blend in the deteriorated imports with edible 
alcohol and various chemicals became inevitable. Commonly, colourant was added into white 
wine to ‘make’ red (Zhong 2002). Substantially mixed, the components of these wines are hard 
to identify (Fu et al. 2017). These imported wines are clearly health concerning. It was 
estimated that such substandard cheap imports took 80 per cent of the market share in China. 
A Chinese wine expert revealed that some legitimate wine manufacturers also used this type 
of imports because they were very cheap (about £456 per ton), whilst domestic grown grapes 
were expensive due to a shortage of vineyards (Zhong 2002).  
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 Along with imported fakes, ‘imported wines’ may be faked in China. Apart from 
labelling as explained earlier, counterfeiters may technically turn domestic wines into ‘imports’ 
in the Customs Special Supervision Zones (CSSZs). The CSSZs were established in 2012 to 
promote the international trade. They are essentially special economic zones managed mainly 
by the provincial Customs. In a CSSZ, goods are subject to simplified customs procedures, tax 
waivers and laxed inspections (The Government of China 2012). It was found that the system 
was abused by unethical entrepreneurs who created the ‘one-day tour’ method to ‘magically 
create’ ‘imported wines’ within a day. Domestic wines, once in a CSSZ, are dealt with as if 
they are imports and cleared for distribution as imported wines in the internal markets (Zhang 
et al. 2013). This illegitimate practice is akin to that identified in the counterfeiting business in 
the EU (see e.g. Hall and Antonopoulos 2016): counterfeiting entrepreneurs make use of the 
special economic zones where the loosened policing and customs infrastructure help facilitate 
the counterfeiting activities, such as falsification of documents to avoid interception of the 
merchandise by the authorities (OECD/EUIPO 2017). For China, an additional question is how 
the counterfeit goods initially entered the CSSZs: is it a side-effect of the economic policy that 
aims to boost the import-export trade, a result of loopholes in practice, or corruption?  
3. Distribution and Sales  
Existing data shows that like legitimate products, fake wines are usually distributed through 
various channels and sold in all kinds of whole-sale and retailer outlets, including online 
marketplaces such as Taobao – a Chinese website for online shopping similar to Amazon and 
eBay. Brand-name foreign wines are often sold at high-priced night clubs, karaoke bars and 
other top-end entertainment facilities. Zhang (2012) observed that Internet vendors willingly 
facilitated sales of counterfeit wine and spirits. Chemicals such as flavouring and colouring 
essences are available online, which are expressly advertised as wine-making ingredients. 
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WeChat messaging and QQ chatrooms – Chinese equivalences of Facebook or WhatsApp – are 
now commonly used to trade in counterfeit goods (Editorial 2015).  
 Detected cases indicate the difficulties in tracing the origin and travel of counterfeits 
because of the vastness of the country and complexity of the counterfeiting business. As fake 
goods are typically made on order, storage is no longer necessary, and counterfeiters tend not 
to keep sales records (China News 2014). Online sales further complicate law enforcement in 
several ways. One is that the existing law is vague in regard to trading in the virtual space and 
in practice, no measures are available to enable effective routine inspection to police online 
marketplaces (Editorial 2015). Consequently, they appear to be a free trade zone for 
counterfeiters.  
 In the context of China, it is not uncommon for unethical entrepreneurs to fill eye-
catching bottles with poor quality wines, package the wine products in elegant-looking gift 
boxes, and sell them at a high price. Doing so may not necessarily infringe others’ IPRs but 
may still be highly profitable. A recently case showed that to make this type of fake wines 
costed less than 100 yuan but retail price could be as high as 3,000 yuan (Editorial 2017). These 
counterfeits are usually sold to deceived consumers. At the same time, wine counterfeiters also 
target ‘deliberate’ consumers who are driven by the tension between various consumption 
needs and affordability and choose to buy fake brand name wines, as illustrated in the notorious 
‘Shanye fake wine movement’ across China (see Dong 2002). Thus, for Jiang (1994), 
consumers’ vanity created a demand in the illegitimate wine market. Although the fake wine 
business can be highly profitable (Zhong 2002), profitability depends on a variety of factors 
(see detailed discussion in Antonopoulos et al. 2017).  
A recent study found no supply of fake Chinese liquor from China to overseas markets 
(Shen and Antonopoulos 2016) possibly due to insufficient demand. As to wines, several 
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isolated incidents were available in the popular media, in which the counterfeit wines seized 
by the Chinese Customs authority were intended for consumers in the United States and Britain, 
and there was a fear of counterfeit wines of Chinese origin being finally making their way 
abroad (Global Legal Post 2015). Apart from that, little evidence suggests the flow of fake 
wine from China to other countries. Nick Bartman, a counterfeit-specialist  lawyer, concluded 
that few of the fake wines in China are for export, and wine counterfeiting is China’s domestic 
problem (Boyce 2012). For Wang Zemin, Deputy Secretary-General of China Wine 
Association, China’s wine market is vast. Thus, there is no need for wine makers to endeavour 
to sell their products abroad (Yi 2011). This should apply to the illegitimate wine trade, too.  
The policing of counterfeit wines   
As suggested earlier, China does seem to have comprehensive and strict laws to curb the wine 
counterfeiting business. However, the problem persists. Several problems have been identified, 
including general weak law enforcement in China, an ‘inadequate administrative apparatus’ 
(Morcom 2008) that hampers effective and efficient implementation of the law, and that in the 
alcohol industry, the administrative structure is blurry (Shen and Antonopoulos 2016). 
Following the FSL 2009, attempt has been made to develop a framework that enables to 
exercise tight control over the food industry, including the alcohol trade.  
Administrative structure and law enforcement players under the FSL 
Similar to other systems such as the UK (see Lord et al. 2017), a variety of authorities and 
agencies share responsibility in fighting alcohol counterfeiting in China, such as the Ministry 
of Health (MoH, public health), China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA, food safety), 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Office (A-CO, IPRs) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, 
criminal investigation). Chart 1 illustrates the administrative structure of enforcement of the 
food safety law, which the alcohol industry is under.  
Chart 1. Administrative Structure of Enforcement of the Food Safety Law 
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Notes 
 
1. GAQSIQ: China General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. 
2. China Food and Drug Administration was established in 2013 and subsequently, it became 
the executive body of SCFSC. 
3. Anti-Counterfeiting Office is a department under Ministry of Commerce (MoC). Strictly 
speaking, it is not part of the administrative structure concerning food safety but may be 
involved (in some places takes the lead) in joint enforcement actions against alcohol 
counterfeiting.  
 
As Chart 1 shows, the administrative structure is centred by the State Council Food Safety 
Committee (SCFSC) and the MoH. SCFSC is a regulatory body for food safety, which was 
established in 2010 and initially led by Li Keqiang – China’s Premier today and then Deputy 
Premier. It is now under directorship of the current first Deputy Premier. The creation of this 
high public office appears to show the commitment of the central government to food safety. 
The MoH (also known as the National Health and Family Planning Commission) takes primary 
responsibility for ensuring food safety, and functions to co-ordinate all public bodies 
responsible for the supervision, inspection and investigation in the food industry.  
Other State Council (SC) components also play a part. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture is responsible for overseeing agricultural products (the start of the food supply 
chain); the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the MoC govern food safety 
in production, distribution and catering services (the end of the food supply chain). Several 
agencies under direct leadership of the SC are enforcement authorities in their particular fields 
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of administration, including CFDA (the executive body of SCFSC), State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ). They are usually called upon and led by the MoH to 
jointly investigate major incidents that involve serious breaches of the food safety law and may 
have a national impact. A similar administrative framework is set up locally, in which it is the 
local government that plays a leadership role (Sections 4, 5 of the FSL).  
Hence, efforts have been made to create a new enforcement model to ensure food safety 
in China. It clearly defines the leadership and brings together multiple authorities and agencies 
at both central and local levels. So far, little evidence is available to indicate whether the new 
model has worked to effectively respond to alcohol counterfeiting. At the same time, gaps in 
practice have been identified (Sun 2010; Zhao and Chu 2010). This is not surprising if we 
consider the common problems appear in other places, where a similar system is adopted, in 
which responsibility lies with multiple authorities with competing agendas (e.g. Lord et al. 
2017). In the case of China, there are further challenges, as we shall see later in this section.  
Compared with that for food safety control, the administrative and enforcement structure 
for IPR protection is far less clear. Under the MoC, there is a national Anti-Counterfeiting 
Office (formally known as ‘Office for the Leading Team for Fighting against IPR 
Infringements and Counterfeit and Substandard Goods’, or ‘da-jia-ban’ abbreviated in 
Chinese). The agency appears to lead and co-ordinate national anti-counterfeiting operations. 
In some regions, the municipal governments have established their own da-jia-ban to play a 
similar role at the local level (Editorial 2007).  
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that SAIC and its local agencies, known as the 
Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce (ABIC), are in part responsible for dealing 
with product counterfeiting, including alcohol counterfeiting. ABICs carry out inspections, 
aiming for prevention and detection. They seem to have certain investigative powers. Sun and 
15 
 
Yao (2004) observed that a local ABIC in Xinjiang conducted a variety of investigative 
activities – overt and covert – and on one occasion, the investigators took the suspects to a hotel 
room for questioning.  
 Likewise, GAQSIQ, formally known as National Administration of Quality and 
Technology Inspection (NAQTI), is a national authority which directs its local bureaus to 
undertake quality supervision and inspection. Counterfeit and substandard goods may be 
detected in routine and reactive inspections, and individuals and businesses involved may be 
administratively sanctioned. The NAQTI also lead national crackdowns on counterfeiting 
goods. For example, it launched an enforcement campaign targeting alcohol counterfeiting in 
2012, jointly with six other central government authorities. Locally, following a tip-off, Dantu 
Bureau of Quality and Technology Inspection (BQTI) in Jiangsu province carried out a reactive 
inspection, which resulted in the detection of a wine counterfeiting workshop and seizure of 
11,208 bottles (nine types) of fake foreign wines (Editorial 2012).  
 In cases of alcohol counterfeiting, apart from ABIC and BQTI, other local agencies, such 
as Bureau of Commerce (formerly, ‘Bureau of Economy and Trade’), local Food and Drug 
Administration and the police. In some serious counterfeiting incidents, the police usually take 
the lead. Where imports and exports are involved, the Customs authorities usually play a central 
part in law enforcement operations, and the Chinese Customs has been praised for their anti-
counterfeiting efforts (e.g. Global Legal Post 2015).  
 In addition, there are periodical national and local anti-alcohol counterfeiting crackdowns 
– the ‘campaign style enforcement’ for Dimitrov (2009) – when there appears to be a rising 
tide of alcohol counterfeiting or when the illicit business activities peak prior to the festival 
seasons, such as the Chinese New Year. Usually, the police lead joint actions with other 
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agencies to raid counterfeiting workshops, make arrests and confiscate fake goods and 
counterfeiting facilities (Xinhua News 2017). 
 It is hard to deny the Chinese government’s efforts to fight against illicit alcohol and that 
enforcement pressure for counterfeiters in China is high. However, the illegitimate business 
seems to hold its ground. There are a number of challenges for law enforcement agencies – 
some are shared with other countries, whilst others are China’s own.  
Actions against wine counterfeiting and remaining problems 
It is pointed out that a system that consists of multiple agencies, with clear leadership and 
collaboration and coopetition strategies is inevitable in the policing of food fraud (Elliott 2014; 
Fassam and Dani 2017). This of course applies to wine counterfeiting. In law enforcement 
practice, a common problem facing the counterfeiting-affected countries, as indicated earlier, 
is the lack of coordination in multi-agency working. As we have seen, in China, a number of 
agencies assume anti-counterfeiting responsibility in relation to the alcohol industry, but there 
lacks a clear division of responsibilities between them. Consequently, no one knows who 
exactly does what, and this is illustrated in a popular saying: one agency cannot manage it 
whereas multiple agencies cannot manage it well (Liu 2013).  
Another shared problem links to departmentalism which may result in administrative 
vacuums in practice. Under departmentalism, each department – authority or agency – works 
to achieve their own objectives, from their own perspectives and in their own fashion. Nothing 
seems to be wrong as these departments are regulated entities striving to follow the laws that 
govern them (Kramer 2004). However, it may leave gaps when each department works only at 
their own goals but fails to go beyond and act on the common goal (Jiao 1998).  
Usually, alcohol counterfeiting, and product counterfeiting in general, is a cross-region 
and even cross-border business. It thus requires national, regional and sometimes also 
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international operations. Information sharing, for example, helps holistically connect supply 
chains in the counterfeiting trade, which allows law enforcement to work seamlessly (Fassam 
and Dani 2017). However, information sharing is not always possible between different 
agencies (see e.g. Lord et al 2017), and agencies in different administrative regions. This is 
also a shared problem.  
There are, of course, problems particularly for China given its unique political, 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions. One problem concerns inconsistency in law 
enforcement and sometimes ‘capricious enforcement’ (Dimitrov 2009). Inconsistency in policy 
and practice appears to be commonplace in China (Shen 2016a), which causes confusion and 
sometimes arbitrariness in law enforcement, and may give rise to legitimacy concerns. For 
example, da-jia-ban is not a public body. Although the agency at both central and local levels 
often leads anti-counterfeiting crackdowns, it is not empowered to conduct investigations, nor 
does it have authority to impose administrative sanctions, but the rules are not always strictly 
followed in the ad hoc anti-counterfeiting practices.  
Past research has identified local protectionism as a problem associated with product 
counterfeiting (see details in Chow 2004; Kramer 2006; Lin 2011; Shen et al. 2010; Shen and 
Antonopoulos 2016). In the present study, the role that local protectionism plays in wine 
counterfeiting is well illustrated in the Changli case, in which the illicit business was apparently 
known to the local authority but ‘overlooked’ because it was viewed to have boosted the local 
economy: along with fake wine makers, the enabling businesses also grew fast by supplying 
ingredients, packaging materials and accessories to the counterfeit businesses (Guangdong 
315.gov 2011). With little incentive, some local authorities keep a slack hand in implementing 
and enforcing the anti-counterfeiting and food safety laws (Liu 2013).  
Corruption has also been linked with the counterfeiting trade (Dinitrov 2009; Editorial 
2007; Jiao 1998). Ye (2004) went further and claimed that counterfeiting signals corruption. 
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Xinhua News – China’s state news agency – once suggested that some local food safety 
authorities turned fines into the ‘protection fees’: once fines were paid, the counterfeiters were 
‘permitted’ to carry on illegitimate production (Guangdong 315.gov 2011). Corruption in 
China is structural (Yang 2016) which partially explains why the central government’s policy 
cannot be fully implemented, and why the national anti-counterfeiting crackdowns may not 
have a real impact on the counterfeiting industry.  
Law enforcement on alcohol counterfeiting in China appears to be heavy-handed. Despite 
the remaining problems, it is recognised that the anti-counterfeiting practice from a food safety 
perspective has improved (Liu 2013), and that the alcohol counterfeiting industry is suppressed 
(Ye 2003). However, little hard available is available to back these up.   
Discussions and conclusion  
This article set out to discuss three major themes in relation to wine counterfeiting in mainland 
China: first, the definitional issue of counterfeiting; second, the scope and scale of the wine 
counterfeiting business and how fakes are made available; and third, the policing of counterfeit 
wines. As we have seen, the findings in this study illustrated a complex and evolving nature of 
the counterfeiting trade. Thus, the definition of counterfeiting requires constant revision to 
reflect the ever-changing characteristics of the ‘second-oldest profession’ (Yang 2016) in 
today’s globalised capitalist business practice.  
For the first theme, it suggested that fake wines in the Chinese markets can be categorised 
into four types: (1) Fake brand-name wines – wine products involving unauthorised use of 
other’s brand names. For example, a wine is made identical to and sold as that of Lafite; (2) 
Passing-off or ‘look-alike’ (Vandagraf 2015) wines – wines that are made to resemble other 
wine brands. For example, a wine is made to mimic Lafite but uses a similar (rather than 
identical) brand-name, such as La Fite or LaFeit; (3) Misrepresented wines. They refer to wines 
– genuine or fake – that are falsely presented to mislead consumers as to their quality and 
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product specifications. For example, for a higher price, a newly brewed wine is misrepresented 
and sold as an aged or vintage wine, or a local wine is offered for sale as an import; and (4) 
False wines – they are fakes that have little or no wine content and thus are essentially not wine. 
The first two categories are typical knock-offs and deliberately trading in them violates 
others’ trademark rights. The second two types may or may not involve IPR infringements, but 
are fraudulent and may amount to crime in China and many other systems including the UK. 
As we have seen, fakes – domestic products and imports – are frequently of inferior quality or 
even made of chemicals which may cause long term and may be serious health consequences. 
The article suggested that wine counterfeiting overlaps with food fraud and as product 
counterfeiting in general, it causes a wide range of harms that is far beyond IPR violation. 
Essentially, it suggests a broader working definition of counterfeiting which has extended that 
of Lin (2011) by embracing illegitimate behaviours which are conducted in the everyday 
counterfeiting business, but involve no IPR infringements, to reflect a more realistic nature of 
product piracy.  
For the second theme, the article detailed some underlying and routine activities in the 
counterfeiting process (Lord et al. 2017). No evidence here has suggested the involvement of 
organised crime rings in the wine counterfeiting trade, and the illicit economic sector in China 
appears to be made up of individuals and small and medium enterprises – similar to the 
counterfeiting phenomenon in the wine and spirits industry in the EU (see EUIPO 2016). In 
line with the existing literature (see e.g. Hall and Antonopoulos 2016; Lord et al. 2017), this 
article noted that legitimate companies also occupied the ‘dirty’ or ‘grey’ markets (Edwards 
and Gill 2002). At the same time, the findings showed that wine counterfeiting – as product 
counterfeiting as a whole – requires a certain level of social, financial and operational 
organisation. In the illicit trade, just like in the legitimate business world, it is essential for 
individual players to cooperate and conspire (Edwards and Gill 2002). Thus, this study 
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examined wine counterfeiting within the analytical framework of organised crime research, 
and hops to contribute to the careful and comprehensive analysis of the nature of the problem 
(Levi and Maguire 2004). A further reason to situate commodity counterfeiting in the context 
of organised crime is to persuade policy makers to prioritise the illicit business on law 
enforcement agenda (e.g. NCA 2016, 2017). 
Towards the end of this article, it becomes clear that the counterfeiting phenomenon is 
an integral part of the capitalist business practice, in which the market rule applies. China, 
among other countries in the developing world, has the ‘global reputation as a “making and 
faking” nation’ (Yang 2016) and it is often blamed for being the largest producing market of 
counterfeit goods in the world (OECD 2016). However, what is overlooked is that developing 
countries are also recipients, consumers (Taylor 2016) and thus victims of the global 
counterfeiting trade. At this article showed, in the counterfeiting world, there are no real 
cultural barriers – anyone from any part of the world may participate in product piracy, as long 
as the individual is motivated by a strong economic incentive and may have a modest amount 
of start-up capital. At the same time, what is also in common in any part of the world – the 
developed and developing economies – is that no one can accept counterfeit goods that harm 
or endanger public health and safety (Pang 2008). This relates to the third theme of this article.  
It suggested that alcohol counterfeiting is a viable business and counterfeiters change 
swiftly to maximise profit and avoid detection. Thus, it is predicted that the cat-and-mouse 
game will continue (Ye 2000). From a law enforcement perspective, the findings in this study 
have helped to identify a number of challenges in anti-counterfeiting practice: some are shared, 
for example, the common problems in multiagency working, whilst others are mainly for China, 
including local protectionism and corruption. They often render anti-counterfeiting 
crackdowns to end up with ‘loud thunder but small raindrops’ in some local areas. They, among 
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others, explain why the national anti-counterfeiting policy and practice in China have not had 
a significant impact on the counterfeiting trade. 
At the policy level, as we have seen, the central government is committed to halt the 
prevalence of the counterfeiting industry, especially from a public health perspective. However, 
in the market economy, entrepreneurial activities – including illegitimate business practices – 
are market-driven. That is to say, as long as the neoliberal policy continues in China, it is hard 
for the state to effectively intervene and stop any money-making methods, even where harsh 
penalties are available for the illegalities (Shen 2016b).  
Compared with other social, legal and economic problems, product counterfeiting is still 
an under-researched area. This article reported a rare study which used wine counterfeiting in 
China as a case study to piece together the disparate parts of the criminal market, and therefore, 
throws some new light on the complex and potentially harmful trade in dangerous counterfeit 
goods. It is hoped that more rigorous empirical approaches can be taken in future studies, to 
gather more first-hand information which helps to develop ‘a clearer understanding of the 
various crime scenes, actors and their resources’ (Levi and Maguire 2004: 457) in the 
illegitimate business sector. In this study, insights into the wine counterfeiting business were 
gained from the rich data drawn from a broad range of published materials: research 
monographs, academic and specialist journals (e.g. the China Anti-Counterfeiting Report), 
official reports and other supporting materials in open sources in both English and Chinese 
languages. Despite the usual limitations of the method and data (see Shen et al. 2010; Shen and 
Antonopoulos 2016), the findings here should have a wider application and are capable of 
providing policymakers and practitioners with an evidence-based understanding of the 
counterfeiting trade, so as to inform policy and practice in China, and beyond.   
Finally, it is worth noting that given the current nature of the wine counterfeiting business 
in China, whichever national anti-counterfeiting measure is taken, it is unlikely to have much 
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external impact on the global wine markets, but may direct international counterfeiters to other 
locations where the marketplace is less regulated and thus more susceptible to alcohol 
counterfeiting.  
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